Towards a Secure Peer-to-Peer App Platform for Clan
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The quest for a secure peer-to-peer app platform has sparked a lively debate, with some commenters questioning whether Clan's GPU-accelerated VM solution truly addresses the original problem of commercial software vs FOSS. While some, like Mic92, clarify that the goal is to bring NixOS and VPNs to non-NixOS desktops, others, like guerrilla and trinsic2, express skepticism about the market demand and potential for complexity. However, dist-epoch and IlikeKitties counter that there's a genuine need for sandboxing and compartmentalization, citing projects like Qubes and Secureblue as examples. As the discussion unfolds, a nuanced understanding emerges: while p2p app distribution is intriguing, its security model is indeed complex, and centralized review is sacrificed for individual developer trust.
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Is is that FOSS needs a standard sandbox and they think some kind of peer to peer app store that disturbes images for VMs is the way to do it?
Maybe they are not the right solution, but they are working on the right problem.
Of course, they don't say the focus on agents, but if the solution works with them, it doesn't matter that it was built for gamers.
It sounds more like a way to take freedom away from people. Commercial systems are designed in such a way that offering that convenience is at the expense of control and ownership. Just because people trade freedoms for this level of ease, doesn't make it right.
Packaging Apps on Linux has been and always will be, a nightmare. Just giving up and sending whole VMs is basically a variant of what docker does.
Permission Management is also quite necessary and Linux Desktop/DBUS is horrible in that regard. There's recently been a post about this[0]. Especially part 5 is just... GNOME Developers being GNOME Developers...
A lot of Apps also open untrusted files and even run untrusted code. Browsers, PDFs, or Excel Macros? God only knows what kind of exploits and hidden software landmines there are.
And last but not least there's also just badly coded apps that can get pwned from remote sources. Think some game running horrible c++ code connecting peer to peer with random clients. All of them could easily buffer overflow some random function and take over all your files.
[0] https://blog.vaxry.net/articles/2025-dbusSucks
Nix made these tradeoffs intentionally to maximize package support and reduce contributor friction. Nix for all its good design choices chose a supply chain integrity threat model that unfortunately makes it suitable only as hobby OS that must not be used to protect anything of value.
Guix at least signs commits, but individual maintainers are still trusted so it is not much better, so there really is no production safe nix based package tree I am aware of.
Nothing should advertise itself as secure while being based on nix.
With that said, I also write a lot of Haskell and would be very sad if nixos dropped support because it was not yet fully bootstrappable. The NixOS supply chain and build pipeline could absolutely be meaningfully hardened, but I think that given the state of the ecosystem at large, and the project's widespread usage as a general purpose OS, achieving the kind of trust model and security guarantees offered by something like stagex is not yet realistic.
It absolutely does not have the supply chain security guarantees it is widely believed to have and that is my core problem with it.
Also you wanted to use stagex for haskell today anyway and accept the risks you totally can but you would want to make a docker build layer to import a pre compiled binary from the internet like nixos does, and then it is very explicit that your resulting software has single party trust. We should have all dependencies of haskell but we cannot safely offer it as a precompiled package. That said as an end user you can of course use stagex in any way that suits your own project threat model.
Happy to help if we can!
[0]: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/76701a179d3a98b07653e2... (does a fetch URL against the pre built .tar.gz from https://download.sublimetext.com)
The risks you list are shared by many distributions, meanwhile NixOS does better in some fronts, particularly around monorepo of open build recipes, SBOM, and flexible overrides to allow security sensitive usecases to limit and control dependencies.
But nonetheless, you list valid limitations, but they aren't inherent.
I'll discuss them below, but note that I don't speak on behalf of NixOS.
> Yet another reminder that Nix does not sign commits, does not sign reviews
I agree we should do this.
> allows any maintainer to merge their own code
The convention is now not to do that. I believe a maintainer recently had their commit bit revoked due to doing this. I don't know why it isn't enforced, but it should be.
> does not compile all packages from source
The vast majority are, and the exceptions are odd cases:
* firefox-bin, where some people prefer Mozilla's build. A source-built alternative "Firefox" is available too.
* firmware stuff
* Proprietary software, e.g. factorio.
* I'm not familiar with the Haskell bootstrapping case you mention in another comment, but if ghc can't be bootstrapped, are you suggesting that GHC shouldn't be available, or that a binary GHC should compile GHC from source? I agree that would be nice to have and I'm just clarifying the issue here.
> Hydra admins can absolutely tamper with builds at any time
I believe build reproduciblity is required to mitigate this risk. That is a useful property that OSS should have, but the reality is that no distribution has that, since so many packages has non-determinism.
Is there a distro that does this well? (I know Debian has spearheaded this, but they too have remaining build reproduciblity issues, and so presumably have similar risks).
Unless you actually know who is committing code and who is reviewing it with 100% mandated commit and review signing, with well vetted maintainer keys, anyone can trivially make a PR under a pseudonym, then merge their own code from their maintainer identity. In effect there is no way to know or enforce who is merging their own code without the hard work of long lived maintainer identity key management that most distros other than Nix and Alpine choose to skip. I am the one that submitted an RFC to Nix to fix this, that was ultimately rejected. In that moment Nix had chosen to favor low friction hobby contributions over security, and this Nix was never going to be useful for the high risk applications.
What offends me about Nix is that it skips all this hard work, and has teams of consultants that do not bill it as the hobby/workstation distro that is is, and instead are charging high risk clients money to recommend they trust nix anyway, never disclosing use of nix opens them up for any of thousands of people to have the power to backdoor their servers with low chance of swift detection.
I actually believe this trend of overpromising security in Nix is going to get people hurt.
> The risks you list are shared by many distributions, meanwhile NixOS does better in some fronts
I totally grant it is better at some of these risks, however it is also worse than classic distros on other fronts, lacking maintainer signatures and web of trust requirements of most OG distros like Debian.
To be clear, I would also not recommend Debian or any distro that places trust in single individuals for production use in the high risk applications.
Stagex (which I founded, so all bias on the table) was created because no existing distro before it was willing to hit a responsible supply chain security bar in my opinion I was comfortable recommending for high risk applications.
It is a container native, 100% full source bootstrapped, and deterministic, with every commit signed by one maintainer, and every review/merge signed by a different maintainer, and every artifact built and signed with matching hashes by at least two maintainers. As of our next release we will be LLVM native. Also it relis on the OCI standard and you can use any OCI compatible toolchains to build any package (though our scripts support docker for now).
https://codeberg.org/stagex/stagex/src/branch/staging#compar... can offer a high level comparison across distros in some of the areas we feel matter most.
Stagex was built to satisfy a threat model of trusting no single maintainer or machine, for high security use cases.
We also indeed reject any packages that are currently not possible to build this way because it is not possible to publish package artifacts under the stagex release process that cannot be full source bootstrapped and built deterministically by multiple maintainers on hardware they independently control. This means we reject packages we cannot safely distribute like Haskell and Ada, but while giving best available supply chain security for most popular languages we do support.
Haskell and Ada do not currently have any way to be built without centralized trust unfortunately but efforts are underway in both cases we will adopt when complete. Any exceptions are a place malware can hide, so no exceptions are permitted.
What is the catch? We were willing to ignore desktop use cases, at least for now, in order to hit a high security bar for software build use cases. As such we have dramatically fewer packages which allow us to hold this line. We are primarily a high supply chain security focused build distribution, though we are used to build a number of other specialized distros like Talos Linux, and AirgapOS. The latter runs on laptops but very minimal for use cases like cryptographic key management.
We will also probably never have the number of packages of Nix, but for the overwhelming majority of organizations a trusted toolchain to build their production services is sufficient to eliminate all forms of linux-distribution-level supply chain attacks by any single compromised maintainer or machine.
https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/453502
github.com/rochecompaan/openziti-nix
if your focus is trying it rather than distributing consistent versions to many folks, you can also use the ziti-edge-tunnel binary, define a systemd service and add identities (a given app or device can belong to (n) OpenZiti overlays via (n) different identities).
Last I checked, docker was FOSS? Containerisation is built in in Linux, does that not compartmentalise enough?
What am I missing here, the article seems wildly inaccurate, surely I've misunderstood something?