Mojo-V: Secret Computation for Risc-V

In other hardware there is an OEM secret because the manufacturer is trying to keep users out of "their hardware", in this case we're trying to keep everyone except the data owner out.

There's no back doors, but there's no integrity checking either, so a Mojo-V voting machine could take an encrypted vote and throw it away and add +1 to the attacker's favorite candidate.

A computational integrity checking mechanism will appear soon that will add a concise proof to every encrypted Mojo-V value, that will prove to the data owner that their requested computation was faithfully performed. And the mechanism also supports safe disclosures, too.

This should give data owners strong controls over what can be done with their data

Who is this we you speak of?

I for one much prefer my cloud services and would love TEE I can control.

> A cheaper and more reliable solution is still on-premises computing.

I assure you that my use of Cloudflare services ($0 in nearly 10 years) is much more reliable and much cheaper than hardware I run.

It’s still not FHE but it’s about as good as you can get otherwise.

For me, I see Mojo-V more like FHE than a TEE, for three primary reasons: 1) Like FHE, the tech is applied to variables and computation that doesn't touch protected variables is not affected. TEEs protect processes. 2) Like FHE, Mojo-V lacks software, timing, and microarchitectural side channels. TEEs are riddled with side channels. 3) Like FHE, no trust is extended to software because it cannot see the data it is processing. TEEs require that clients trust that the attested software has their best interests in mind.

Public key signing is like SGX, the vendor signs the public to certify that it is from real Mojo-V hardware.