Bag of Words, Have Mercy on Us
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The term "bag of words" has sparked a lively debate, with some commenters pointing out its existing association with a different concept in natural language processing, while others are exploring alternative descriptions for large language models (LLMs). Descriptions like "superpowered sentence completion," "glorified autocomplete," and "spicy autocomplete" have gained traction, with some arguing they accurately capture the essence of LLMs, while others feel they oversimplify the technology's capabilities. As one commenter noted, when LLMs can refactor entire code repositories, "sentence completion" doesn't quite do justice to their abilities. The discussion highlights the ongoing struggle to understand and articulate the true nature of LLMs, with some proposing new terms like "Spoken Query Language" to better capture their functionality.
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My second thought is that it's not the metaphor that is misleading. People have been told thousands of times that LLMs don't "think", don't "know", don't "feel", but are "just a very impressive autocomplete". If they still really want to completely ignore that, why would they suddenly change their mind with a new metaphor?
Humans are lazy. If it looks true enough and it cost less effort, humans will love it. "Are you sure the LLM did your job correctly?" is completely irrelevant: people couldn't care less if it's correct or not. As long as the employer believes that the employee is "doing their job", that's good enough. So the question is really: "do you think you'll get fired if you use this?". If the answer is "no, actually I may even look more productive to my employer", then why would people not use it?
Yes, subconsciously I kept trying to map this article's ideas to word2vec and continuous-bag-of-words.
That said, I think the author's use of "bag of words" here is a mistake. Not only does it have a real meaning in a similar area as LLMs, but I don't think the metaphor explains anything. Gen AI tricks laypeople into treating its token inferences as "thinking" because it is trained to replicate the semiotic appearance of doing so. A "bag of words" doesn't sufficiently explain this behavior.
Its useful, it's amazing, but as the original text says, thinking of it as "some intelligence with reasoning " makes us use the wrong mental models for it.
Its useful, it's amazing, but as the original text says, thinking of it as "some intelligence with reasoning " makes us use the wrong mental models for it.
I feel that's more a description of a search engine. Doesn't really give an intuition of why LLMs can do the things they do (beyond retrieval), or where/why they'll fail.
"Self-awareness" used in a purely mechanical sense here: having actionable information about itself and its own capabilities.
If you ask an old LLM whether it's able to count the Rs in "strawberry" successfully, it'll say "yes". And then you ask it to do so, and it'll say "2 Rs". It doesn't have the self-awareness to know the practical limits of its knowledge and capabilities. If it did, it would be able to work around the tokenizer and count the Rs successfully.
That's a major pattern in LLM behavior. They have a lot of capabilities and knowledge, but not nearly enough knowledge of how reliable those capabilities are, or meta-knowledge that tells them where the limits of their knowledge lie. So, unreliable reasoning, hallucinations and more.
Anthropic has discovered that this is definitely the case for name recognition, and I suspect that names aren't the only things subject to a process like that.
The contra-positive of "All LLMs are not thinking like humans" is "No humans are thinking like LLMs"
And I do not believe we actually understand human thinking well enough to make that assertion.
Indeed, it is my deep suspicion that we will eventually achieve AGI not by totally abandoning today's LLMs for some other paradigm, but rather embedding them in a loop with the right persistence mechanisms.
> Gen AI tricks laypeople into treating its token inferences as "thinking" because it is trained to replicate the semiotic appearance of doing so. A "bag of words" doesn't sufficiently explain this behavior.
Something about there being significant overlap between the smartest bears and the dumbest humans. Sorry you[0] were fooled by the magic bag.
[0] in the "not you, the layperson in question" sense
Whenever the comment section takes a long hit and goes "but what is thinking, really" I get slightly more cynical about it lol
By now, it's pretty clear that LLMs implement abstract thinking - as do humans.
They don't think exactly like humans do - but they sure copy a lot of human thinking, and end up closer to it than just about anything that's not a human.
It can kinda sorta look like thinking if you don't have a critical eye, but it really doesn't take much to break the illusion.
I really don't get this obsessive need to pretend your tools are alive. Y'all know when you watch YouTube that it's a trick and the tiny people on your screen don't live in your computer, right?
The answer to that is the siren song of "AI effect".
Even admitting "we don't know" requires letting go of the idea that "thinking" must be exclusive to humans. And many are far too weak to do that.
Person-metaphor does nothing to explain its behavior, either.
"Bag of words" has a deep origin in English, the Anglo-Saxon kenning "word-hord", as when Beowulf addresses the Danish sea-scout (line 258)
"He unlocked his word-hoard and delivered this answer."
So, bag of words, word-treasury, was already a metaphor for what makes a person a clever speaker.
If instead of a chat interface we simply had a "complete the phrase" interface, people would understand the tool better for what it is.
The fact that pretraining of ChatGPT is done with a "completing the phrase" task has no bearing on how people actually end up using it.
> But we don’t go to baseball games, spelling bees, and Taylor Swift concerts for the speed of the balls, the accuracy of the spelling, or the pureness of the pitch. We go because we care about humans doing those things.
My first thought was does anyone want to _watch_ me programming?
Let us not forget the old saw from SICP, “Programs must be written for people to read, and only incidentally for machines to execute.” I feel a number of people in the industry today fail to live by that maxim.
It suggests to me, having encountered it for the first time, that programs must be readable to remain useful. Otherwise they'll be increasingly difficult to execute.
It’s patently false in that code gets executed much more than it is read by humans.
https://metr.org/blog/2025-03-19-measuring-ai-ability-to-com...
And it never got better, the superior technology lost, and the war was won through content deals.
Lesson: Technology improvements aren't guaranteed.
The RNN and LSTM architectures (and Word2Vec, n-grams, etc) yielded language models that never got mass adoption. Like reel to reel. Then the transformer+attention hit the scene and several paths kicked off pretty close to each other. Google was working on Bert/encoder only transformer, maybe you could call that betamax. Doesn’t perfectly fit as in the case of beta it was actually the better tech.
OpenAI ran with the generative pre trained transformer and ML had its VHS? moment. Widespread adoption. Universal awareness within the populace.
Now with Titans (+miras?) are we entering the dvd era? Maybe. Learning context on the fly (memorizing at test time) is so much more efficient, it would be natural to call it a generational shift, but there is so much in the works right now with the promise of taking us further, this all might end up looking like the blip that beta vs vhs was. If current gen OpenAI type approaches somehow own the next 5-10 years then Titans, etc as Betamax starts to really fit - the shittier tech got and kept mass adoption. I don’t think that’s going to happen, but who knows.
Taking the analogy to present - who in the vhs or even earlier dvd days could imagine ubiquitous 4k+ vod? Who could have stood in a blockbuster in 2006 and knew that in less than 20 years all these stores and all these dvds would be a distant memory, completely usurped and transformed? Innovation of home video had a fraction of the capital being thrown at it that AI/ML has being thrown at it today. I would expect transformative generational shifts the likes of reel to cassette to optical to happen in fractions of the time they happened to home video. And beta/vhs type wars to begin and end in near realtime.
The mass adoption and societal transformation at the hands of AI/ML is just beginning. There is so. much. more. to. come. In 2030 we will look back at the state of AI in December 2025 and think “how quaint”, much the same as how we think of a circa 2006 busy Blockbuster.
I wouldn't say VHS was a blip. It was the recorded half video of media for almost 20 years.
I agree with the rest of what you said.
I'll say that the differences in the AI you're talking about today might be like the differences between VAX, PC JR, and the Lisa. All things before computing went main stream. I do think things go mainstream from tech a lot faster these days, people don't want to miss out.
I don't know where I'm going with this, I'm reading and replying to HN while watching the late night NFL game in an airport lounge.
That said, I was struck by a recent interview with Anthropic’s Amanda Askell [2]. When she talks, she anthropomorphizes LLMs constantly. A few examples:
“I don't have all the answers of how should models feel about past model deprecation, about their own identity, but I do want to try and help models figure that out and then to at least know that we care about it and are thinking about it.”
“If you go into the depths of the model and you find some deep-seated insecurity, then that's really valuable.”
“... that could lead to models almost feeling afraid that they're gonna do the wrong thing or are very self-critical or feeling like humans are going to behave negatively towards them.”
[1] https://www.anthropic.com/research/team/interpretability
[2] https://youtu.be/I9aGC6Ui3eE
Can you give some concrete examples? The link you provided is kind of opaque
>Amanda Askell [2]. When she talks, she anthropomorphizes LLMs constantly.
She is a philosopher by trade and she describes her job (model alignment) as literally to ensure models "have good character traits." I imagine that explains a lot
https://www.anthropic.com/news/golden-gate-claude
Excerpt: “We found that there’s a specific combination of neurons in Claude’s neural network that activates when it encounters a mention (or a picture) of this most famous San Francisco landmark.”
https://www.anthropic.com/research/tracing-thoughts-language...
Excerpt: “Recent research on smaller models has shown hints of shared grammatical mechanisms across languages. We investigate this by asking Claude for the ‘opposite of small’ across different languages, and find that the same core features for the concepts of smallness and oppositeness activate, and trigger a concept of largeness, which gets translated out into the language of the question.”
https://www.anthropic.com/research/introspection
Excerpt: “Our new research provides evidence for some degree of introspective awareness in our current Claude models, as well as a degree of control over their own internal states.”
All useful shorthands, all which lead to people displaying fundamental misunderstandings of what they're talking about - i.e. expressing surprise that a nation of millions doesn't display consistency of behavior of human lifetime scales, even though fairly obviously the mechanisms of government are churning their make up constantly, and depending on context maybe entirely different people.
For example, if you've worked at a large company, one of the little tragedies is when someone everyone likes gets laid off. There were probably no people who actively wanted Bob to lose his job. Even the CEO/Board who pulled the trigger probably had nothing against Bob. Heck, they might be the next ones out the door. The company is faceless, yet it wanted Bob to go, because that apparently contributed to the company's objective function. Had the company consisted entirely of different people, plus Bob, Bob might have been laid off anyway.
There is a strong will to do ... things the emerges from large structures of people and technology. It's funny like that.
Their vivid descriptions of what the Emperor could be wearing doesn't make said emperor any less nakey.
I did a simple experiment - took a photo of my kid in the park, showed it to Gemini and asked for a "detailed description". Then I took that description and put it into a generative model (Z-Image-Turbo, a new one). The output image was almost identical.
So one model converted image to text, the other reversed the processs. The photo was completely new, personal, never put online. So it was not in any training set. How did these 2 models do it if not actually using language like a thinking agent?
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/G7gTuf8WkAAGxRr?format=jpg&name=...
By having a gazillion of other, almost identical pictures of kids in parks in their training data.
My fridge happily reads inputs without consciousness, has goals and takes decisions without "thinking", and consistently takes action to achieve those goals. (And it's not even a smart fridge! It's the one with a copper coil or whatever.)
I guess the cybernetic language might be less triggering here (talking about systems and measurements and control) but it's basically the same underlying principles. One is just "human flavored" and I therefore more prone to invite unhelpful lines of thinking?
Except that the "fridge" in this case is specifically and explicitly designed to emulate human behavior so... you would indeed expect to find structures corresponding to the patterns it's been designed to simulate.
Wondering if it's internalized any other human-like tendencies — having been explicitly trained to simulate the mechanisms that produced all human text — doesn't seem too unreasonable to me.
I've completely given up on using LLMs for anything more than a typing assistant / translator and maybe an encyclopedia when I don't care about correctness.
At least the human tone implies fallibility, you don’t want them acting like interactive Wikipedia.
I stumbled across a good-enough analogy based on something she loves: refrigerator magnet poetry, which if it's good consists of not just words but also word fragments like "s", "ed", and "ing" kinda like LLM tokens. I said that ChatGPT is like refrigerator magnet poetry in a magical bag of holding that somehow always gives the tile that's the most or nearly the most statistically plausible next token given the previous text. E.g., if the magnets already up read "easy come and easy ____", the bag would be likely to produce "go". That got into her head the idea that these things operate based on plausibility ratings from a statistical soup of words, not anything in the real world nor any internal cogitation about facts. Any knowledge or thought apparent in the LLM was conducted by the original human authors of the words in the soup.
Did she ask if a "statistical soup of words," if large enough, might somehow encode or represent something a little more profound than just a bunch of words?
Sure, this is not the same as being a human. Does that really mean, as the author seems to believe without argument, that humans need not be afraid that it will usurp their role? In how many contexts is the utility of having a human, if you squint, not just that a human has so far been the best way to "produce the right words in any given situation", that is, to use the meat-bag only in its capacity as a word-bag? In how many more contexts would a really good magic bag of words be better than a human, if it existed, even if the current human is used somewhat differently? The author seems to rest assured that a human (long-distance?) lover will not be replaced by a "bag of words"; why, especially once the bag of words is also ducttaped to a bag of pictures and a bag of sounds?
I can just imagine someone - a horse breeder, or an anthropomorphised horse - dismissing all concerns on the eve of the automotive revolution, talking about how marketers and gullible marks are prone to hippomorphising anything that looks like it can be ridden and some more, and sprinkling some anecdotes about kids riding broomsticks, legends of pegasi and patterns of stars in the sky being interpreted as horses since ancient times.
There's a quote I love but have misplaced, from the 19th century I think. "Our bodies are just contraptions for carrying our heads around." Or in this instance... bag of words transport system ;)
I mean I use AI tools to help achieve the goal but I don’t see any signs of the things I’m building and doing being unreliable.
Either way, in what way is this relevant? If the human's labor is not useful at any price point to any entity with money, food or housing, then they presumably will not get paid/given food/housing for it.
Neither of these is entirely true in all cases, but they could be expected to remain true in at least some (many) cases, and so the role for humans remains.
What does it mean to say that we humans act with intent? It means that we have some expectation or prediction about how our actions will effect the next thing, and choose our actions based on how much we like that effect. The ability to predict is fundamental to our ability to act intentionally.
So in my mind: even if you grant all the AI-naysayer's complaints about how LLMs aren't "actually" thinking, you can still believe that they will end up being a component in a system which actually "does" think.
Do you have a proof for this?
Surely such a profound claim about human thought process must have a solid proof somewhere? Otherwise who's to say all of human thought process is not just a derivative of "predicting the next thing"?
What would change your mind? It's an exercise in feasibility.
For example, I don't believe in time travel. If someone made me time travel, and made it undeniable that I was transported back to 1508, then I would not be able to argue against it. In fact, no one in such position would.
What is that equivalent for your conviction? There must be something, otherwise, it's just an opinion that can't be changed.
You don't need to present some actual proof or something. Just lay out some ideas that demonstrate that you are being rational about this and not just sucking up to LLM marketing.
That's not a proof. Think harder about the questions people are asking you here.
The near-religious fervor which people insist that "its just prediction" makes me want to respond with some religious allusions of my own:
> Who is this that wrappeth up sentences in unskillful words? Gird up thy loins like a man: I will ask thee, and answer thou me. Where wast thou when I laid up the foundations of the earth? tell me if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it?
The point is that (as far as I know) we simply don't know the necessary or sufficient conditions for "thinking" in the first place, let alone "human thinking." Eventually we will most likely arrive at a scientific consensus, but as of right now we don't have the terms nailed down well enough to claim the kind of certainty I see from AI-detractors.
The harms engendered by underestimating LLM capabilities are largely that people won't use the LLMs.
The harms engendered by overestimating their capabilities can be as severe as psychological delusion, of which we have an increasing number of cases.
Given we don't actually have a good definition of "thinking" what tack do you consider more responsible?
Speculative fiction about superintelligences aside, an obvious harm to underestimating the LLM's capabilities is that we could effectively be enslaving moral agents if we fail to correctly classify them as such.
Much worse, when insufficiently skeptical humans link the LLM to real-world decisions to make their own lives easier.
Consider the Brazil-movie-esque bureaucratic violence of someone using it to recommend fines or sentencing.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-07856-5
I’m downplaying because I have honestly been burned by these tools when I’ve put trust in their ability to understand anything, provide a novel suggestion or even solve some basic bugs without causing other issues.?
I use all of the things you talk about extremely frequently and again, there is no “thinking” or consideration on display that suggests these things work like us, else why would we be having this conversation if they were ?
I've had that experience plenty of times with actual people... LLMs don't "think" like people do, that much is pretty obvious. But I'm not at all sure whether what they do can be called "thinking" or not.
Language and society constrains the way we use words, but when you speak, are you "predicting"? Science allows human beings to predict various outcomes with varying degrees of success, but much of our experience of the world does not entail predicting things.
How confident are you that the abstractions "search" and "thinking" as applied to the neurological biological machine called the human brain, nervous system, and sensorium and the machine called an LLM are really equatable? On what do you base your confidence in their equivalence?
Does an equivalence of observable behavior imply an ontological equivalence? How does Heisenberg's famous principle complicate this when we consider the role observer's play in founding their own observations? How much of your confidence is based on biased notions rather than direct evidence?
The critics are right to raise these arguments. Companies with a tremendous amount of power are claiming these tools do more than they are actually capable of and they actively mislead consumers in this manner.
Yes. This is the core claim of the Free Energy Principle[0], from the most-cited neuroscientist alive. Predictive processing isn't AI hype - it's the dominant theoretical framework in computational neuroscience for ~15 years now.
> much of our experience of the world does not entail predicting things
Introspection isn't evidence about computational architecture. You don't experience your V1 doing edge detection either.
> How confident are you that the abstractions "search" and "thinking"... are really equatable?
This isn't about confidence, it's about whether you're engaging with the actual literature. Active inference[1] argues cognition IS prediction and action in service of minimizing surprise. Disagree if you want, but you're disagreeing with Friston, not OpenAI marketing.
> How does Heisenberg's famous principle complicate this
It doesn't. Quantum uncertainty at subatomic scales has no demonstrated relevance to cognitive architecture. This is vibes.
> Companies... are claiming these tools do more than they are actually capable of
Possibly true! But "is cognition fundamentally predictive" is a question about brains, not LLMs. You've accidentally dismissed mainstream neuroscience while trying to critique AI hype.
[0] https://www.nature.com/articles/nrn2787
[1] https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262045353/active-inference/
The thing you're doing here has a name: using "emergence" as a semantic stopsign. "The system is complex, therefore emergence, therefore we can't really say" feels like it's adding something, but try removing the word and see if the sentence loses information.
"Neurons are complex and might exhibit chaotic behavior" - okay, and? What next? That's the phenomenon to be explained, not an explanation.
This was articulated pretty well 18 years ago [0].
[0]: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/8QzZKw9WHRxjR4948/the-futili...
It doesn't even meaningfully engage with the historical literature that established the term, etc. If you want to actually understand why the term gained prominence, check out the work of Edgar Morin.
The article argues that the brain "predicts" acts of perception in order to minimize surprise. First of all, very few people mean to talk about these unconscious operations of the brain when they claim they are "thinking". Most people have not read enough neuroscience literature to have such a definition. Instead, they tend to mean "self-conscious activity" when they say "thinking". Thinking, the way the term is used in the vernacular, usually implies some amount of self-reflexivity. This is why we have the term "intuition" as opposed to thinking after all. From a neuronal perspective, intuition is still thinking, but most people don't think (ha) of the word thinking to encompass this, and companies know that.
It is clear to me, as it is to everyone one the planet, that when OpenAI for example claims that ChatGPT "thinks" they want consumers to make the leap to cognitive equivalence at the level of self-conscious thought, abstract logical reasoning, long-term learning, and autonomy. These machines are designed such that they do not even learn and retain/embed new information past their training date. That already disqualifies them from strong equivalence to human beings, who are able to rework their own tendencies toward prediction in a meta cognitive fashion by incorporating new information.
https://xkcd.com/810/
So notice that my original claim was "prediction is fundamental to our ability to act with intent" and now your demand is to prove that "prediction is fundamental to all mental activity."
That's a subtle but dishonest rhetorical shift to make me have to defend a much broader claim, which I have no desire to do.
> Language and society constrains the way we use words, but when you speak, are you "predicting"?
Yes, and necessarily so. One of the main objections that dualists use to argue that our mental processes must be immaterial is this [0]:
* If our mental processes are physical, then there cannot be an ultimate metaphysical truth-of-the-matter about the meaning of those processes.
* If there is no ultimate metaphysical truth-of-the-matter about what those processes mean, then everything they do and produce are similarly devoid of meaning.
* Asserting a non-dualist mind therefore implies your words are meaningless, a self-defeating assertion.
The simple answer to this dualist argument is precisely captured by this concept of prediction. There is no need to assert some kind of underlying magical meaning to be able to communicate. Instead, we need only say that in the relevant circumstances, our minds are capable of predicting what impact words will have on the receiver and choosing them accordingly. Since we humans don't have access to each other's minds, we must not learn these impacts from some kind of psychic mind-to-mind sense, but simply from observing the impacts of the words we choose on other parties; something that LLMs are currently (at least somewhat) capable of observing.
[0] https://www.newdualism.org/papers/E.Feser/Feser-acpq_2013.pd...
If you read the above link you will see that they spell out 3 problems with our understanding of thought:
Consciousness, intentionality, and rationality.
Of these, I believe prediction is only necessary for intentionality, but it does have some roles to play in consciousness and rationality.
To my understanding, bloaf's claim was only that the ability to predict seems a requirement of acting intentionally and thus that LLMs may "end up being a component in a system which actually does think" - not necessarily that all thought is prediction or that an LLM would be the entire system.
But I'd personally go further and claim that correctly generating the next token is already a sufficiently general task to embed pretty much any intellectual capability. To complete `2360 + 8352 * 4 = ` for unseen problems is to be capable of arithmetic, for example.
My personal assessment is that LLMs can do neither.
If it turns out that LLMs don't model human brains well enough to qualify as "learning abstract thought" the way humans do, some future technology will do so. Human brains aren't magic, special or different.
They’re certainly special both within the individual but also as a species on this planet. There are many similar to human brains but none we know of with similar capabilities.
They’re also most obviously certainly different to LLMs both in how they work foundationally and in capability.
I definitely agree with the materialist view that we will ultimately be able to emulate the brain using computation but we’re nowhere near that yet nor should we undersell the complexity involved.
If so, yes, they're thinking
If I throw some braincells into a cup alongside the dice, will they think about the outcome anymore than the dice alone?
That's not what we have here.
"It is only a fallacy if you "P, therefore C" which GP is not (at least to my eye) doing."
Some people are willfully blind.
"A.I. and humans are as different as chalk and cheese."
As aphorisms are a good way to think about this topic?
From this point on its all about efficiencies:
modeling efficiency: how do we best fit the elephant, with bezier curves, rational polynomials, ...?
memory bandwidth training efficiency: when building coincidence statistics, say bigrams, is it really necessary to update the weights for all concepts? a co-occurence of 2 concepts should just increase the predicted probability for the just observed bigram and then decrease a global coefficient used to scale the predicted probabilities. I.e. observing a baobab tree + an elephant in the same image/sentence/... should not change the relative probabilities of observing french fries + milkshake versus bicycle + windmill. This indicates different architectures should be possible with much lower training costs, by only updating weights of the concepts observed in the last bigram.
and so on with all other kinds of efficiencies.
“Internal combustion engines and human brains are both just mechanisms. Why would one mechanism a priori be capable of "learning abstract thought", but no others?”
The question isn't about what an hypothetical mechanism can do or not, it's about whether the concrete mechanism we built does or not. And this one doesn't.
I will absolutely say that all ML methods known are literally too stupid to live, as in no living thing can get away with making so many mistakes before it's learned anything, but that's the rate of change of performance with respect to examples rather than what it learns by the time training is finished.
What is "abstract thought"? Is that even the same between any two humans who use that word to describe their own inner processes? Because "imagination"/"visualise" certainly isn't.
If you consider that LLMs have already "learned" more than any one human in this world is able to learn, and still make those mistakes, that suggests there may be something wrong with this approach...
Some machines, maybe. But attention-based LLMs aren't these machines.
To a limited degree, they can compensate for being such slow learners (by example) due to the transistors doing this learning being faster (by the wall clock) than biological synapses to the same degree to which you walk faster than continental drift. (Not a metaphor, it really is that scale difference).
However, this doesn't work on all domains. When there's not enough training data, when self-play isn't enough… well, this is why we don't have level-5 self-driving cars, just a whole bunch of anecdotes about various different self-driving cars that work for some people and don't work for other people: it didn't generalise.
It's not just that. The problem of “deep learning” is that we use the word “learning” for something that really has no similarity with actual learning: it's not just that it converges way too slowly, it's also that it just seeks to minimize the predicted loss for every samples during training, but that's no how humans learn. If you feed it enough flat-earther content, as well a physics books, an LLM will happily tells you that the earth is flat, and explain you with lots of physics why it cannot be flat. It simply learned both “facts” during training and then spit it out during inference.
A human will learn one or the other first, and once the initial learning is made, it will disregards all the evidence of the contrary, until maybe at some point it doesn't and switches side entirely.
LLMs don't have an inner representation of the world and as such they don't have an opinion about the world.
The humans can't see the reality for itself, but they at least know it exists and they are constantly struggling to understand it. The LLM, by nature, is indifferent to the world.
This is a terrible example, because it's what humans do as well. See religious, or indeed military, indoctrination. All propaganda is as effective as it is, because the same message keeps getting hammered in.
And not just that, common misconceptions abound everywhere and not just conspiracy theories, religion, and politics. My dad absolutely insisted that the water draining in toilets or sinks are meaningfully influenced by the Coriolis effect, used an example of one time he went to the equator and saw a demonstration of this on both sides of the equator. University education and lifetime career in STEM, should have been able to figure out from first principles why the Coriolis effect is exactly zero on the equator itself, didn't.
> A human will learn one or the other first, and once the initial learning is made, it will disregards all the evidence of the contrary, until maybe at some point it doesn't and switches side entirely.
We don't have any way to know what a human would do if they could read the entire internet, because we don't live long enough to try.
The only bet I'd make is that we'd be more competent than any AI doing the same, because we learn faster from fewer examples, but that's about it.
> LLMs don't have an inner representation of the world and as such they don't have an opinion about the world.
There is evidence that they do have some inner representation of the world, e.g.:
• https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.02996
• https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18202
You completely misread my point.
The key thing with humans isn't that they cannot believe in bullshit. They can definitely do. But we don't usually believe in both the bullshit and in the fact the the BS is actually BS. We have opinions on the BS. And we, as a species, routinely die or kill for these opinions, by the way. LLM don't care about anything.
I can't parse what you mean by this.
> LLM don't care about anything.
"Care" is ill-defined. LLMs are functions that have local optima (the outputs); those functions are trained to approximate other functions (e.g. RLHF) that optimise other things that can be described with functions (what humans care about). It's a game of telephone, like how Leonard Nimoy was approximating what the script writers were imagining Spock to be like when given the goal of "logical and unemotional alien" (ditto Brent Spiner, Data, "logical and unemotional android"), and yet humans are bad at writing such characters: https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/StrawVulcan
But rather more importantly in this discussion, I don't know what you care about when you're criticising AI for not caring, especially in this context. How, *mechanistically*, does "caring" matter to "learning abstract thought", and the question of how closely LLMs do or don't manage it relative to humans?
I mean, in a sense, I could see why someone might argue the exact opposite, that LLMs (as opposed to VLMs or anything embodied in a robot, or even pure-text agents trained on how tools act in response to the tokens emitted) *only* have abstract "thought", in so far as it's all book-learned knowledge.
> I can't parse what you mean by this.
The point is that humans care about the state of a distributed shared world model and use language to perform partial updates to it according to their preferences about that state.
Humans who prefer one state (the earth is flat) do not -- as a rule -- use language to undermine it. Flat earthers don't tell you all the reasons the earth cannot be flat.
But even further than this, humans also have complex meta-preferences of the state, and their use of language reflects those too. Your example is relevant here:
> My dad absolutely insisted that the water draining in toilets or sinks are meaningfully influenced by the Coriolis effect [...]
> [...] should have been able to figure out from first principles why the Coriolis effect is exactly zero on the equator itself, didn't.
This is an exemplar of human behavior. Humans act like this. LLMs don't. If your dad did figure out from first principles and expressed it and continued insisting the position, I would suspect them of being an LLM, because that's how LLMs 'communicate'.
Now that the what is clear -- why? Humans experience social missteps like that as part of the loss surface. Being caught in a lie sucks, so people learn to not lie or be better at it. That and a million other tiny aspects of how humans use language in an overarching social context.
The loss surface that LLMs see doesn't have that feedback except in the long tail of doing Regularized General Document Corpora prediction perfectly. But it's so far away compared to just training on the social signal, where honesty is immediately available as a solution and is established very early in training instead of at the limit of low loss.
How humans learn (embedded in a social context from day one) is very effective at teaching foundational abilities fast. Natural selection cooked hard. LLM training recipes do not compare, they're just worse in so many different ways.
[1] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-024-62539-5
As the result, all living cells with DNA emit coherent (as in lasers) light [2]. There is a theory that this light also facilitates intercellular communication.
[2] https://www.sciencealert.com/we-emit-a-visible-light-that-va...
Chemical structures in dendrites, not even neurons, are capable to compute XOR [3] which require multilevel artificial neural network with at least 9 parameters. Some neurons in brain have hundredths of thousands of dendrites, we are now talking of millions of parameters only in single neuron's dendrites functionality.
[3] https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aax6239
So, while human brains aren't magic, special or different, they are just extremely complex.
Imagine building a computer with 85 billions of superconducting quantum computers, optically and electrically connected, each capable of performing computations of a non-negligibly complex artificial neural network.
Planes and boats disrupt the environments they move through and air and sea freight are massive contributors to pollution.
Predict the right words, predict the right reasoning conclusion, predict when the ball bounces, etc. Then reversing predictions that we have learned. I.e. choosing the action with the highest prediction of the outcome we want.
Also, people confuse these four levels of algorithm:
• 1 - The architecture.
This input-output calculation for pre-trained models are very well understood. We put together a model consisting of matrix/tensor operations and few other simple functions, and that is the model. Just a normal but high parameter calculation.
• 2 - The training algorithm.
These are completely understood.
There are certainly lots of questions about what is most efficient, alternatives, etc. But training algorithms harnessing gradients and similar feedback are very clearly defined.
• 3 - The type of problem a model is trained on.
These basic problem forms are well understood. For instance, for prediction we have an ordered series of information, with later information to be predicted from earlier information. It could simply be an input and response that is learned. Or a long series of information.
• 4 - The solution learned to solve (3) the base problem, using (2) the training algorithm on (1) the model architecture.
This, people keep confusing with 1, 2 or 3. But it is very different.
For starters, in the general case, and for most any challenging problem, we never understand their solution. Someday it might be routine, but today we don't even know how to approach that for any significant problem, beyond some simple analysis.
Secondly, even with 1, 2, and 3 exactly the same, 4 is going to be wildly different based on the data characterizing the specific problem to solve. For complex problems, like language, layers and layers of sub-solutions to sub-problems have to be solved, and since models are not infinite in size, ways to repurpose sub-solutions, and weave together sub-solutions to address all the ways different sub-problems do and don't share commonalities.
Yes, prediction is the outer form of their solution. But to do that they have to learn all the relationships in the data. And there is no limit to how complex relationships in data can be. So no limit on the depths or complexity of the solutions of successfully trained models.
Any argument they don't reason, based on the fact that they are being trained to predict, confuses at least 3 and 4.
It is true, they reason a lot more like our "fast thinking", intuitive responses, than our careful deep and reflective reasoning. And they are missing important functions, like a sense of what they know or don't. They don't continuously learn while inferencing. Or experience meta-learning, where they improve on their own reasoning abilities directly, like we do. But they do reason.
Today, despite many successful models, nobody understands how models are able to reason like they do. There is shallow analysis. The weights are there to experiment with. But nobody can walk away from the model and training process, and build a language model directly themselves. We have no idea how to independently replicate what they have learned, despite having their solution right in front of us. Other than going through the whole process of retraining another one.
A test I did myself was to ask Claude (The LLM from Anthropic) to write working code for entirely novel instruction set architectures (e.g., custom ISAs from the game Turing Complete [5]), which is difficult to reconcile with pure retrieval.
[1] Lovelace, A. (1843). Notes by the Translator, in Scientific Memoirs Vol. 3. ("The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform.") Primary source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Scientific_Memoirs/3/Sketch_o.... See also: https://www.historyofdatascience.com/ada-lovelace/ and https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2015/12/untangling-the-t...
[2] https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238
[3] https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Turing_Paper_1936.pdf
[4] https://web.stanford.edu/class/sts145/Library/life.pdf
[5] https://store.steampowered.com/app/1444480/Turing_Complete/
To be fair, everage person couldn't answer this either, at least not without thorough research.
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