Automating Rootless Docker Host Updates with Ansible
Postedabout 2 months agoActiveabout 2 months ago
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The article discusses automating rootless Docker host updates using Ansible, providing a technical solution for managing Docker environments.
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First scenario: the machine is single-purpose and protects a single asset (confidential data, access to a privileged network, etc). In this case, XKCD 1200 (https://xkcd.com/1200/) applies: attackers can already steal all the valuable goods using the application's user and do no need to escalate local privileges.
Second scenario: the machine is multi-purpose and spans multiple security domains. In this case, keep in mind the Linux kernel is a sieve when it comes to local privilege escalations and you need to use hypervisor-level isolation (separate VMs) anyway, and then you're back to single-purpose VMs where every individual workload can happily be root in its VM and do away with the cargo cult.
Maybe something like bsd's "pledge" where user-invoked processes don't get all capabilities automatically?
Linux has been too "high trust" for a while now, and I don't know what the appetite is for us all digging out of it is...
Hypervisor-based security seems to be the least worst way to deal with this problem currently, and indeed appears to be a successful defense given cloud providers’ bottom-lines.
I fully agree with your argument: Hypervisor isolation is the best for multi-tenant security. In a single-purpose VM, the primary threat is often the application itself. There are two primary reasons for me to use docker in a rootless namespace:
1. It narrows the attack surface & simplifies operations: Running the Docker daemon itself as root presents a high-value target. A vulnerability in the daemon (like a flaw in the API, `containerd`, `runc`, etc.) becomes an instant "game over" for the entire host. The benefits of running the daemon in a user namespace are:
2. A great tradeoff for resource-constrained environments: Yes, a fleet of single-purpose VMs is ideal. But it's often not feasible from a resource or cost perspective, especially in a homelab or small business environment. My stack is a compromise that layers security: This stack allows me to run ~30 distinct services across ~10 LXCs on a single machine with an average CPU utilization of just 1-2%. Achieving this level of service density with full VMs would be impossible on the same hardware due to memory and CPU overhead.Rootless Docker is the final layer that provides meaningful separation within the cost-effective LXC containers.
Lastly: You're right to point out that the kernel can be a sieve. No single layer is perfect. But the goal of defense in depth is to force an attacker to defeat multiple, distinct security mechanisms to achieve their goal.
One last point: This principle is so important that newer tools like Podman were designed from the ground up to be rootless by default, which I'd recommend for anyone starting fresh today.
[1]: https://du.nkel.dev/blog/2023-12-12_mastodon-docker-rootless...