Fcc Updates Covered List to Include Foreign Uas and Uas Critical Components [pdf]

> Federal planning for the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Olympics already assumes that UAS will be a central threat vector. CISA’s soft‑target and UAS guidance notes that crowded venues, transportation nodes, and public‑gathering areas are particularly vulnerable to hostile drone activity.9 Recent congressional hearings on mass‑gathering security have emphasized that UAS are now a routine part of incident planning, alongside more traditional threats.10 The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of War are already investing heavily in detection, tracking, and mitigation capabilities with these specific events in mind.11 UAS are also playing a critical enabling role on the battlefield in many modern conflicts. In Ukraine and Israel-Gaza, low-cost commercial UAS inflict extensive damage and have caused significant loss of life.12 Drug Cartels are also reportedly using foreign-produced UAS to smuggle drugs into the United States and carry out attacks.

I'm sure, the ban on DJI devices will stop fentanyl and terrorists.

I don't understand how banning future drones helps national security in any way.

It's not either-or, it should be both.

The obvious corollary is that Canada, Greenland & Denmark (Panama, Venezuela, etc. too) and all their allies should get rid of all Windows computers, all Apple phones, all Tesla, etc, etc.

It's hard to imagine USA are not planning attacks right now using these tech vectors, given this threat model is being defended against in this way.

It was as equally clever as it was evil to put pressure on us to ditch Chinese tech, so USA can now attack us.

Source? My understanding is that Ukrainian drones are pretty much 100% off-the-shelf Chinese components.

For regular airplanes flown by highly trained pilots relying on pilots to put in the effort to learn of changes that might affect a trip works. If a regular airplane pilot flies somewhere they are not supposed to be because they didn't check NOTAMs or were using outdated charts no one is going to say Cessna needs to do more to keep pilots from making those mistakes.

For drones, which require much less training and are sold to consumers, it is much more likely that the operators won't keep up to date. A spate of consumer drones entering restricted airspace would definitely lead to serious pressure on the makers to do something about it.

Similar for updates that fix bugs. With airplanes it is reasonable to expect the operator to apply any updates that the maker releases that fix bugs that might affect airworthiness. With drones, not so much.

Theft, for one. Anything that can be re-sold secondhand with no way for the owner to verify it hasn't been stolen will get stolen and re-sold for drug money.

You don't hear mass reports from hobos attacking people for their iPhones any more ever since Apple introduced Activation Lock and Find My, for example. Yes, there still are professionals shipping stolen devices off to China to be parted out and yes, I think we should hold China accountable because there's more than enough evidence at that point, but still, it has drastically cut back on the everyday thefts and robberies.

Same thing along supply chains. A container full of expensive things, no matter if it's drones, laptops, phones or sneakers, is a very attractive thing for insiders - but devices needing activation are, assuming a supply chain able to track serial numbers of devices inside containers, effectively worthless other than for parts and Apple is even cutting in on that "market". In contrast, you have routine train heists for millions of dollars worth in sneakers [1].

[1] https://www.sneakerfreaker.com/news/la-train-heist-sneakers-...

So when they find your drone crashed into the Whitehouse lawn, they can track it back to you rather than rely on you to phone in a confession.

https://slate.com/technology/2015/03/white-house-lawn-drone-...

> The 31-year-old Usman lost control of a Phantom FC40 drone owned by a friend early that morning, and telephoned his employers and the Secret Service to report the incident when he learned the small model aircraft had been found on the White House grounds.

Shouldn't there been some sort of planning for a local company to provide at least comparable products before needlessly wreaking havoc like this ?

https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist

The new addition: Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country†† and all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 118-159)

1709(a)(1) in it's entirety: IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, an appropriate national security agency shall determine if any of the following communications or video surveillance equipment or services pose an unaccept- able risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons:

(A) Communications or video surveillance equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (commonly known as ‘‘DJI Technologies’’). (B) Communications or video surveillance equipment produced by Autel Robotics. (C) With respect to an entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) (referred to in this subparagraph as a ‘‘named entity’’)— (i) any subsidiary, affiliate, or partner of the named entity; (ii) any entity in a joint venture with the named entity; or (iii) any entity to which the named entity has a technology sharing or licensing agreement. (D) Communications or video surveillance services, including software, provided by an entity described in sub- paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) or using equipment described in such subparagraphs. (2) ADDITION TO COVERED LIST.—If the appropriate national security agency does not make a determination as required by paragraph (1) within one year after the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall add all communications equipment and services listed in paragraph (1) to the covered list. (b) INCLUSION OF CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT TO COVERED LIST.— (1) DETERMINATIONS.—Not later than 30 days after an appropriate national security agency determines that any of the communications equipment or services specified in sub- section (a)(1) present an unacceptable risk to the national secu- rity of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons— (A) the Commission shall place such communications equipment or services on the covered list; and (B) the appropriate national security agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on their determination which shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. (2) OTHER DETERMINATIONS.—Not later than 30 days after an appropriate national security agency determines that any of the communications equipment or services specified in sub- section (a)(1) do not present an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons— (A) that agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on their determinations, which shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex; and (B) within 180 days following the determination, all other appropriate national security agencies shall review the determination and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on their determinations, which shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) The term ‘‘appropriate national security agency’’ has the same meaning as the term in section 9 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1608)). (2) The term ‘‘Commission’’ means the Federal Communica- tions Commission. (3) The term ‘‘covered list’’ means the list of covered commu- nications equipment or services published by the Commission under section 2(a) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act. (4) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Com- mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Select Committee on Intelligence in the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and Com- merce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel- ligence in the House of Representatives. (5) The term ‘‘technology sharing agreement’’ means an agreement where a named entity licenses their technology to a company directly or through an intermediary manufacturer. (d) SAVINGS CLAUSE.—Nothing herein shall be construed to override or affect the uses permitted by sections 1823 through 1832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) and sections 936 and 1032 of the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law 118–63), including the duration thereof. If the Commission places communications equipment or services on the covered list pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section, the appropriate national secu- rity agency shall provide the Commission with necessary informa- tion on whether enabling those uses is appropriate and how to enable those uses if necessary, and the Commission may promulgate implementing rules or policies accordingly.