German Government Comes Out Against Chat Control
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The German government has come out against Chat Control, a proposed EU surveillance measure, sparking widespread support and relief among commenters who value digital privacy and are wary of government overreach.
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-ChatControl, as it is currently defined, is not going to happen, because it's absolutely stupid and would make impossible, amongst other things, online banking
-Yet, there is a growing and legitimate demand for lawful interception of 'chat' services. I mean, "sure, your bank account got emptied, but we can't look into that because it happened via Signal" just isn't a good look
-So, something has got to give. Either 'chat' services need to become 'providers of telecoms services' and therefore implement lawful interception laws, or the malware industry will continue to flourish, or something even more stupid will happen
Pick your poison.
I don't know what you mean by this.
> But please note that I did not list "online banking becoming impossible" as a likely outcome.
No, but it should be a likely and maybe even desired outcome, especially if a justification for surveillance is the prevention of online banking fraud among other crimes.
> Merely malware continuing to be state-sponsored, or certain communications to be surveilled.
Norms and mores change over time, so the only conclusion is that "certain communications" will become "all communications" at some point in the future. I'd love to be proven wrong.
Yeah, but laws tend to be more constant, and lawful interception laws are, 100% guaranteed, a thing, right now, in the country where you live.
They apply to telegrams, postal mail, telephone conversations, and a whole bunch of other things nobody really does anymore. They don't really apply to the things people do tend to do these days.
ChatControl is an incompetent attempt to remediate the lapses in law enforcement that this has caused. I strongly oppose it. But I also strongly oppose the idea that the Internet should be off limits for any kind of law enforcement, unless it is through dubious mechanisms like state-sponsored malware.
Your "slippery slope" argument is much more compelling in the absense of extended lawful interception than in the situation where Signal messages would somehow be equated to postcards or SMS messages...
Something does have to give: the constant demands for interception capabilities on end-to-end encrypted protocols. Those demands must be thoroughly destroyed every time they rear their head again.
It's just local image hashing and matching? Or is this only one implementation idea?
If you needed any indication for how these pseudo-charities (usually it's a charity front and a commercial "technology partner") are not interested in the public good, SafeToNet, a company that up until last year was trying to sell a CSAM livestream detection system to tech companies to "help become compliant" ("SafeToWatch") now sells a locked down Android phone to overprotective parents that puts an overlay on screen whenever naked skin can be seen (of any kind). It's based on a phone that retails for 150 pounds - but costs almost 500 with this app preinstalled into your system partition. That's exceptionally steep for a company that up until last year was all about moral imperatives to build this tech.
The two sides in this debate seem to be talking at cross purposes, which is why it goes round and round.
A: "We need to do this, however it's done, it was possible before so it must be possible now"
B: "You can't do this because of the implementation details (i.e. you can't break encryption without breaking it for everyone)"
ad infinitum.
Regardless of my own views on this, it seems to me that A needs to make a concrete proposal
Apps like Signal don't entirely fall within the scope of these, which is the cause of the current manic attempts to grab more powers.
My point is that these powers grabs should be resisted, and that new services should be brought into the fold of existing laws.
The prevailing opinion here seems to be that, instead, state hacking should be endorsed. Which, well...
If you want to prosecute people send physical goons, which are of limited quantity, rather than limitless, cheaper and better by the day pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything.
OK, sorry to keep repeating myself here, but... I strongly oppose any kind of "panopticon" like ChatControl.
What I would like to see, is, say, Signal complying with lawful interception orders in the same way that any EU telecoms provider currently does.
So, provide cleartext contents of communications to/from a cleary identified party, for a limited time, by judicial order, for a clearly specified reason.
> pervasive surveillance of everybody and everything
This is exactly what lawful intercept laws are supposed to prevent. And yeah, of course, abuse, but under a functioning rule of law there are at least ways to remedy that, unlike with mass surveillance and/or malware...
Those statements simply aren't compatible.
Right now, Signal is designed by cryptography experts to provide the best privacy we know how to build: messages are only readable by you or the intended recipient. "Lawful intercept" necessarily means some additional third party is given the ability to read messages.
It doesn't matter what kind of legal framework you have around that, because you can't just build a cryptosystem where the key is "a warrant issued under due process." There has to be a system, somewhere, that has access to plaintext messages and can give law enforcement and courts access. The judges, officers, technicians, suppliers, and software involved in building and using this system are all potential vectors by which this access can be compromised or misused -- whether via software or hardware attacks, social engineering, or abuse of power.
Maybe your country has "functioning rule of law", and every single government official and all the vendors they hire are pure as snow, but what about all the rest of us living in imperfect countries? What about when a less-than-totally-law-abiding regime comes into power?
You're proposing that we secure our private conversations with TSA luggage locks.
No -- that's an incredibly reductive summary, and the attitude you display here is, if left unchecked, exactly what will allow something equally ridiculous like ChatControl to pass eventually.
There has been plenty of previous debate when innovations like postal mail, telegraph traffic and phone calls were introduced. This debate has resulted in laws, jurisprudence, and corresponding operating procedures for law enforcement.
You may believe there are no legitimate reasons to intercept private communications, but the actual laws of the country you live in right now say otherwise, I guarantee you. You may not like that, and/or not believe in the rule of law anymore anyway, but I can't help you with that.
What I can hopefully convince you of, is that there needs to be some way to bring modern technology in line with existing laws, while avoiding "9/11"-style breakdowns of civil rights.
What is most striking about our "mandated microphone" analogy is the utter futility of it. Criminals have no issue breaking the law, and hence have no issue outfitting a room with no microphones in which to carry out their dealings. The same is true of any law targeting encrypted chats.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoon
And how in the world can we have safety if relational trust is suffocated before it can even take root?
Please use your imagination! Those aren't the only options if we embrace trust as essential rather than looking at any need for it as a liability.
Do you want the police to regularily intercept and check your signal chats for fraud and crime so this does not happen, or what is the point here?
No, that's not how lawful intercept laws work.
I want police to be able to obtain a judicial order to intercept, for a limited time, in cleartext, the (Signal chats, or whatever other encrypted communications) of identified parties reasonably suspected to be involved with criminal activity.
ChatControl is not that, and it's one of the reasons it's a nonstarter.
They already have that in most (?) jurisdictions by now.
With a warrant, they can install a virus on the device that will then do targeted surveillance.
ChatControl is bad, because it is blanket surveillance of everyone without warrant.
Yeah, and that sponsors an entire malware industry!
I don't really know how I can make my position any clearer, but...
-Malware: bad!
-ChatControl (encryption backdoors): bad!
-Inability to do any kind of law enforcement involving "the Internet": double-plus bad!
-Enforcement of existing lawful interception laws in the face of new technology: maybe look at that?
You could state in plain words what do you propose as an alternative.
I read what you wrote, but have no idea what you propose.
It's literally the last item in my list?
But to further clarify: I would like existing lawful interception laws to be extended to services like Signal.
Not in the sense that any EU country should be able to break Signal crypto (as ChatControl proposes, and which I think is an utterly ill-advised idea), but that competent law enforcement agencies should be able to demand unencrypted Signal communications from/to an identified EU party, for a limited time and purpose, upon a (reviewable) judicial order.
Most, if not all, EU countries currently have similar laws applying to telegrams, snail mail, email, telephony and whatnot. If you don't like those either, that's fine, but that's the status quo, and I would like to see that extended to services like Signal, as opposed to incompetently dumb measures like ChatControl...
Or would you go extreme and outlaw decentraliced encrypted communication alltogether?
Should Thailand be granted access to enforce their lease majeste laws, for example? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A8se-majest%C3%A9_in_Th...
Who gets to decide what gets made available to who?
We're taking about ChatControl here, so law enforcement of EU countries, under their respective laws, into which EU law should have been incorporated
> Should Thailand be granted access to enforce their lease majeste laws
Same answer as "should Thailand be granted arrest rights to enforce <whatever>": they submit a legal assistance request to the country where the alleged crime occurred.
In the case of a lawful interception request for "lease[sic] majeste" reasons, I'm pretty sure this would be immediately rejected.
But, if not, the EU subject of such interception would have lots and lots of avenues to get redress.
Again, and I'm getting sort of tired from repeating myself: "lawful interception" does not mean "indiscriminate surveillance at the whim of whomever" -- it is a well-defined concept that has been used to determine which telegrams and mail pieces to open and which telephone calls to record for ages now. Your country absolutely does it, as we speak, no matter where you live. It's just that modern technology has far outpaced the scope of this legislation, and things like ChatControl are (incompetent) responses to that.
ChatControl is not a good idea, and has very little chance of becoming reality. But to stop dumb proposals like this from coming up over and over again, something has got to give.
There's a different set of laws for that...
But, in a jurisdiction with a functioning rule of law, these abuses can be spotted and remedied.
Doing the same for mass surveillance (such as ChatControl) or state-sponsored malware is much harder.
I'm advocating against ChatControl and malware, and proposing existing lawful interception frameworks as an alternative. But, apparently it's not my day :)
The reason we know is because authorities were able to place listening devices into the rooms that they were in, or surveil them from other buildings.
I’m still unconvinced that this make’s law enforcement’s job so hard that something has to give.
If you're the victim, just hand over the relevant chats yourself. Otherwise, just follow the money. And if the attackers are sitting in a country whose banks you can't get to cooperate, intercepting chat messages from within that country won't do you any good either.
Also, if someone has malicious intent and is part of a criminal network, the people within that network would hardly feel burdened by all digital messages on all popular apps being listened in on by the government. These people will just use their own private applications. Making one is like 30min of work or starting at $50 on fiverr.
Because if lawful interception of in-transit messages is not possible or permitted, hacking either the client or the server becomes the only option.
You may enjoy reading https://therecord.media/encrochat-police-arrest-6500-suspect.... Or just downvoting me. Or both.
Of the serious criminals, the only ones you'll be catching are those with low technical knowledge (everyone else will just be using their own applications) and the Venn diagram of those with little tech knowledge and those whose digital privacy practices could deceive law enforcement resembles AA cups against a pane of glass.
Regarding Encrochat, it is no surprise that an (unintentional?) watering hole gathered up a bunch of tech-illiterate, the fallacy is that those people wouldn't have been caught if they weren't allowed to flock to a single platform for some time.
Would some people have not been caught until much later or even not at all? Sure, but if LE would do its job (and not ignoring, or even covering up, well known problem areas and organizations for years to decades), only those of low priority.
Is that little gain worth creating a tool to allow Iran or similar countries to check every families' messages if they suspect some family member might be gay?
Hard nope.
> Or just downvoting me.
Don't worry, I rarely do that and that's not just because I can't...
The challenging regulations around technically anonymous crypto currencies require you to actively make trackable arrangements with your financial service providers. VERY few people will ever do this, and therefore if anything suspicious were to occur, all you've achieved is putting yourself on the suspect list preemptively.
Why on earth would mass intercept be necessary or even help in that?
If you got scammed by someone, then you can contact the police and hand over your message history. Why would the cops be interested in someone else's message history for this?
Lawful interception is not "mass intercept."
It's the ability to surveil traffic from/to a clearly identified party, upon a judicial order for specific reason, for a limited time.
ChatControl, on the other hand, is mass interception. I'm against it. Most people in the EU are against it. But to prevent things like ChatControl coming up over and over again, a basic tool to combat Internet crime is required.
The problem is nobody uses them to combat crime on the internet. They use them for stupid shit usually or stuff that involves lots and lots of money.
We're jumping the gun here. We already have a fire bomb, and we're not using it, but we're going ahead to developing the nuke. Makes no sense.
Chat Control seeks to execute on each and every device before/after encryption so it has access to the data pre/post encryption.
If the servers don't have it, what do you do? You go to the end points, you issue a warrant, and there's your unencrypted data.
What if they don't wanna do that? I don't know, that's out of scope.
People refuse warrants all the time. You know what we DON'T do? Say, "fuck it" and no longer require warrants.
Again, let's look at good old mail. I can encrypt mail. I can write in ciphers.
Okay, now FedEx gets a warrant. They give me the mail. I can't read it. Uh oh. What do I do? I go to the sender and recipient, and I issue warrants. Problem solved.
That's how we do things, that's how weve always done things, and that's the only reasonable way to do things. We don't say "hey post office, open up every letter and read it. And if it sounds suspicious, tell us". We don't do that.
Okay, so everyone understands that and there's no confusion. When we go online, suddenly there's confusion. Is it confusion, or is the confusion a viel for authoritarian?
Now we have found “lawful intercept” can easily just become mass surveillance, and not just by the people who are meant to use it but other parties too. We saw this with CALEA which was used by China (and who knows who else) for espionage and spying for years before anyone realised.
You make a system for the “good guys” and it always turns out adversary, criminal groups etc. will gain access, even if the “good guys” don’t start acting like bad guys themselves.
Technology made mass surveillance easy, so every lawful intercept becomes mass surveillance as well as vulnerable to scammers, criminals and foreign intelligence.
And we don’t have any way of making lawful intercept possible without that unfortunately.
If people speak up and say "take away our rights" at a referendum, let that be their decision, not a political backroom deal.
[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1232/oj
[2] Article 10 at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.h...
Lawful intercept laws exist in most, if not all, EU countries.
It's just that super-national overlay services like Signal don't entirely fall within the framework of those.
So, there is now a choice: expand interception powers indefinitely (a.k.a. ChatControl, which, to make things crystal-clear, I'm 100% against), or bring new services into the fold of existing legislation.
Lawful interception is not proactive: it requires a judicial order to collect plaintext communications from/to specifically identified individuals (resident in the country demanding the interception), for a limited time and for a specific purpose.
ChatControl, which I strongly argue AGAINST would sort-of be what you describe. But: I. Am. Arguing. AGAINST. That.
Eve, a police officer has evidence that Alice and Bob are messaging each other about crimes and obtains a warrant to require Charlie to intercept their communication. Charlie has no ability to do so because it is encrypted with keys known only by Alice and Bob.
If you want a different result, someone has to proactively change part of this process. Which part should change?
One option is to mandate that any encrypted messaging software also give a key to the government or the government's designee, but someone using open source software can modify it so that it doesn't do that, which would be hard or impossible to detect without a forensic search of their device.
Another option is to mandate that a service provider like Charlie's only deliver messages after verifying that it can decrypt them. This, too is hard to enforce because users can layer additional encryption on top of the existing protocol. Signal's predecessor TextSecure did that over SMS.
Both of those options introduce a serious security vulnerability if the mechanism for accessing the mandatory escrowed keys were ever compromised. Would you like to suggest another mechanism?
If you have the ability to run custom software—even if it’s a bash script—you can develop secure alternatives. And even if you somehow restrict open source messaging, I can just use good old pen-and-paper OTP to encrypt the plaintext before typing it in, or copy/paste some other text pre-encrypted in another program. But even then, all this will do is kick off a steganographic arms race. AI generated text where the first letter of each word is the cyphertext may be nearly impossible to identify, especially at scale.
If anything like this were to pass, my first task would be making a gamified, user-friendly frontend for this kind of thing.
Don’t give them any ideas!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_global_telecommunications... https://unshakled.org/salt-typhoon-the-unintended-consequenc... https://group2000.com/articles/a-wake-up-call-for-securing-l...
That anyone thinks this blatantly obvious attack on free speech is actually going to be used only for law enforcement is wild to me.
It's the task of parliaments, governments, and courts to reevaluate and resolve all these contradictions over and over again. It's tedious and takes a lot of resources, but that's the price for democracy.
The constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (i.e. North Korea) famously guarantees freedom of expression as a fundamental right for the people. That hasn't stopped the government from trampling all over freedom of expression, though. The EU is of course nowhere near North Korea in terms of what is considered acceptable, but don't ever trust that the words in the constitution will be enough to keep the government from doing something.
The most obvious mechanism is a constitutional amendment, but in the U.S. the only amendment to be drafted and adopted in modern times is the 26th amendment (1971), 54 years ago. (The 27th amendment had a weird status where it was belatedly adopted with a 200-year delay.) It's hard to imagine many constitutional amendments actually being passed now because it's been challenging to find consensus on many things within U.S. politics lately.
I don't know that the EU at a supranational level has any mechanism at all to ban future EU directives. Maybe they could decide to remove something from the list of areas of competence of the EU? But Chat Control is under the "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice" and I can't imagine the EU deciding that that should be abandoned as an area of Union competence.
Edit: The international human rights treaties, at least in regulating law enforcement, have tended not to follow the idea that some kind of regulation or law enforcement power is completely off-limits, but just that they need procedural safeguards -- especially for surveillance and investigatory powers. In this case, Chat Control opponents (including me) would like it to be completely off-limits, but the human rights instruments arguments might more naturally go into "did they create enough surrounding rules and mechanisms about how it's used and how it's regulated?" rather than "can we just say governments just can't make this rule?".
Yet still that was never enough for a clear and definitive "no".
It is very likely that the people in favor of this would still try to push it through, or let that happen. They know that the legal battle afterwards to determine its unlawfulness would take years.
And during that time it could already be put it place. And once the legal battle is over (and likely won) severe damage is done and they could still adapt the law or just offer companies to continue doing this "voluntarily". And personally I wouldn't count on Apple, Google, or Facebook to roll this back quickly in that case once they've put it into place.
Speech is restricted the world over for things (fraud, threats, libel/slander, secrets, and more), and we're almost universally in favour of that.
It's a balancing act, and the point where we set the balance is difficult, and constantly changing (should we allow speech that encourages the persecution of other people, sometimes called "hate speech" or should people be allowed to advocate for the murder/rape/extermination of other human beings because of the way they look)
That's not to say that private communication can't already be illegal; mere 'conspiracy' is a crime in many places. Yet the level of surveillance that would be enabled by legislation like Chat Control is greater than any other in history. Even notorious agencies like the Stasi had to pick and choose their targets based on prior suspicion, simply because of the logistics involved in traditional surveillance.
We don't fully know what effects this kind of unceasing, universal monitoring would have on society, and what little historical precedent exists doesn't bode well. Restrictions on public speech however are pretty well understood; we've had censorship in various forms pretty much everywhere in the world at one point or another. We can look to history for lessons about what happens, and can properly discuss (even if not agree!) about when censorship is good or bad for society.
Edit: To anyone reading and thinking of joining in to any of the discussions, the message is clear - Facebook or Reddit level of inanity is all you will find here.
Sure, there is the rollercoaster, ups and downs, small wins and losses going on all the time. But look at the general trends - these freedoms that we enjoyed are by and large being chipped away, it's all trending down, worldwide. It's two steps back, one step forward. Maybe CC doesn't get put in place this particular time, but they will ram it through eventually, at some point the right angle will be found to make the right people vote for it. Then the battleground will move onto something even more egregious, and so on. I'm not seeing why there would be a sudden reversal of this trend in the coming decades.
In fact, if ChatControl does fail, they have already planned to include this in ProtectEU - a larger package coming soon...
No matter what the state says, or what legislatures pass what laws, we're going to continue to live out our right to general purpose computing, including sending only what we choose to send over the wire, and encrypting content as we see fit.
Now let's talk about something else.
Civil disobedience involves breaking the law with full knowledge that it's illegal, to protest injustice.
By way of example: in the United States, the 1st amendment to the constitution guarantees freedom of "the press" - it is referenced not by the right to print what one wants, but specifically in reference to the technology of the time, the printing press.
It's obvious that our evolutionary trajectory is one in which widely distributed general purpose computing is normal.
Making laws that contradict this is just childish, and at some point the adults in the room need to be willing to ignore them.
In fact the proposed chat control law has an exception for government agencies
People are not going to stop sending each other their boobs or penii, and while that remains the case, encrypted messaging will thrive.
Ok, maybe these are not weasel words in this case. The CDU probably wants to present itself as a friend of the people using a popular issue that they don't really care about. My suspicion is that this is exactly why the ChatControl issue is brought up yearly. It distracts people from wars, the economy etc., there is a big discussion and finally the government graciously comes down on the side of the people. Each and every year.
Were this true, some politicians would do it for that reason. It would need to get a lot of attention to be an effective distraction, and it does not. The mainstream press barely covers the issue. Many people who would be directly harmed by it don't even know what's being considered.
It's no wonder we see the countries that oppose this as well. Makes one think. Sweden's case is peculiar given their military opposed it. I wonder what's going on there.
¹ Quelle = source, TKÜ = Telekommunikationsüberwachung = telecommunication surveillance. aka installing trojans on your devices.
Contemporary examples include the Philippines, Hungary, Poland's Law and Justice Party, and arguably Russia, Turkey and India. Modi is a Hindu nationalist. The United States unfortunately is shaping up to count as an example as well.
Extreme forms of nationalism tend to have a narrative of grievance, a desire to restore a once a great national identity, and a tendency to divide the world into loyal citizens, and enemies without and within, against whom authoritarians powers must be mobilized.
So there's a conceptual basis, in terms of setting the stage for rationalizing authoritarianism, as well as abundant historical examples demonstrating the marriage of nationalism and authoritarianism in action. There's nothing wrong with not knowing, but I would say there's an extremely strong and familiar historical canon to those who study the topic.
Those also had:
- grievance narratives;
- a tendency to divide the world into loyal citizens and enemies; and,
- use the above to justify authoritarian powers.
You haven’t shown that nationalism played a particular part in that cycle; just that it also happened in nationalist states. Almost like the problem is those factors, rather than nationalism.
I think the major difference in their respective cases pertain to the ideological dynamics of the particular strains of communism that manifested in those countries. What they lack is a fixation on the purity of national heritage as a primary source of moral truth and a foundation for a self conception. Instead they tended to regard themselves as part of universal, international struggle and understood conflict in economic and ideological terms. What they had in common was the sense that conflict with this chosen enemy necessitated authoritarianism.
There's more than one path to authoritarianism, and they overlap. Different mechanisms don't disprove one another, they exist side by side.
As did the CCP [1]:
> Ideals and convictions are the spiritual banners for the united struggle of a country, nation and party, wavering ideals and convictions are the most harmful form of wavering.
[0] https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers...
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology_of_the_Chinese_Commun...
You are getting downvoted because this pretty basic stuff. Either you’re part of today’s lucky 10k, or your post reads very much like far-right Gish galloping.
Germans, and Germany are obviously quite sensitive to the dangers of nationalism and authoritarianism. Not just because of WW2, but also the experience of East Germany.
Blame the Jews, the immigrants, the trans, and then people will grudgingly accept the Gestapo, ICE, prosecution without proof or courts.
Which then allows you to target the opposition without proof.
Their conclusion is that "[...] ethnic and elitist forms of nationalism, which combine to forge exclusive nationalism, help to perpetuate autocratic regimes by continually legitimating minority exclusions [...]"
Right-wing nationalism as we're currently experiencing it is exclusive. It broadly advocates for restoring revised historical cultural narratives of a particular ethnic group, for immigration restriction and immigrant removal, for further minority culture erasure, and so on.
1: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:859c6af4-d4fd-461e-b605-42...
Feudalism did not have this concept; a country was the land belonging to a king (or equivalent), mediated through a set of nobles. There was no concept of illegal or legal immigration; the population of a country were the people who worked for, or were owned by, the nobles ruling that country. There were land rights granted to peasants who had historically lived in that place, but these could and were often overruled by nobles.
European nobility had no such idea of ethnicity or national grouping; the English monarchy is a German family, and most of European nobility were related to each other much more closely than to the citizens of their country.
Early post-monarchy states didn't have this concept. The English Civil War and the French Revolution didn't create states that had a defined concept of the citizen as a member of any ethnic grouping. Again, there's no mention of immigration in any of the documents from this period. It just wasn't a concept they thought about.
The whole concept that a nation-state is a formalisation of a historical grouping of ethnically related people is a very recent one, only a couple of hundred years old.
So to answer your question: It is very easy to have a sovereign country without a policy that prevents unfettered immigration; you just don't care about your population being ethnically diverse. Your citizens are the people who live in your country, and have undergone whatever ceremony and formality you decide makes them citizens.
This is, after all, how America historically did this; if you arrived in America and pledged allegiance, you became a citizen of America.
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2021/kw02-de-p...
https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2018/kw08-de-v...
https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/304/1930412.pdf
https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/111/1911127.pdf
>https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2018/kw08-de-v...
Other European countries like Switzerland, also banned full face veils(burqas) in public. Try entering a bank, city hall, school, etc with a balaclava, ski mask or motorcycle helmet see how that goes.
>https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/304/1930412.pdf
Allowing the surveillance of minors if they show signs of radicalization? This to me makes sense under existing child protection laws. If kids are being raised in environments that are harmful to themselves and society, should we just sit by and let them get permanently wrecked till they reach adulthood, over a technicality? The earlier you can catch the issues the better for everyone and the higher the chance you can rescue the child. Existing child protection laws in Germany already allow the state a lot of power to take children away from parents if they're seen as unfit.
>https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/111/1911127.pdf
Taking citizenship away from those who voluntarily join terrorist organizations like ISIS? 100% agree with this, how could you not?
These are common sense viewpoints a lot of Europeans agree with, not authoritarian ones.
Taking rights away from people labelled as terrorists is a pretty standard way for governments to control viewpoints. It gives them the power to add any group they don't like to a list, and deport/imprison them with minimal judicial process.
I don't know enough about surveillance of minors to comment on that one.
Given the UK's recent use of anti-terrorist legislation to arbitrarily classify a protest organisation as terrorists, this is really dangerous. If the government can classify any organisation as terrorists, and then remove citizenship from any members of that organisation, that is horrifying.
So yes, I very, very, strongly disagree with this measure, for very good reasons. How could anyone with any common sense support it?
Sounds great on paper, until it starts happening to X, which is your group, now suddenly a terrorist organization, and you happened to have joined in their view.
Because governments shouldn’t be allowed to just wash their hands of any responsibility to a citizen, just because they don’t like their views, regardless of how extreme and vile those views maybe.
We have judicial systems for a reason. If someone joins a terrorist organisation, you arrest them and allow the justice system to determine the consequences. Allow governments to strip citizenships is effectively a mechanism to allow governments to avoid due process and their own judicial systems. Those are never healthy behaviours in any democracy.
Societies should deal with their own citizens properly, not just strip them of citizenship and declare them someone else’s problem. I have no idea why anyone would believe making it effectively impossible to ever leave, except by dying, terrorist organisation would be a good idea. That must ensure all members of terrorist organisations literally have nothing else to live for. I don’t know about you, but I don’t want to ensure that all terrorist go out with a bang.
Extreme collectivism affects both extreme, that is the concept that people are nothing but sacrificial lambs for the religion, the country, or the revolution.
In addition to the authoritarian aspect pointed out by a sibling comment, the far-right generally consider the ends to justify the means because of their sense of righteousness. They will compromise their values to get what they want (control over others). Just look at the hypocrisy of the free-speech absolutists on twitter who have no complaints over Lonnie shutting down Leftist accounts.
It’s an odd phenomenon called a mass formation in large populations, when groups of people get fixated or obsessed with a certain concept or even a thing that the group ourself becomes self-reinforcing; usually until a point of exhaustion is reached or self-destruction. It can also be effectively injected into a culture as it was in Germany’s case after the war through endless and limitless collective and hereditary blame abuse to the point that Germans generally do not have self-respect, and if they show even a slight bit of self-respect they are branded far right, as of that means anything being the subconscious conditioning people have been subjected to.
It’s kind of sad and unfortunate and humanity should never have allowed the collective torture, abuse, and punishment of Germans even to this day 80 years later. It’s a sick and depraved thing only the most devious and evil people would condone, let alone perpetrate.
We seem to have a general problem with people not understanding that democracies have regular elections and the other party is going to get back in at some point. So then whenever one party is in power, instead of thinking ahead by five minutes and realizing that adding new constraints on the government and adding rather than eroding checks and balances will help you the next time the other team gets in, everybody thinks of them as an impediment to doing whatever they want immediately.
And then like clockwork they get butthurt when they checks they eroded or failed to put into place aren't there after the next election, as if they had nothing to do with it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_in_Germany
https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/russia-today-verbot...
1. Censorship in German constitutional law is only defined as the state pre-screening before publication. That's a very narrow area and rarely applies. Most people from an US legal tradition will consider censorship to include other things such as mandating removal of certain content after the fact, but that's different legal branches with different mechanisms (i.e. libel).
2. What Schulz is talking about in the second link definitely is state censorship (blocking a TV station), but it's not implemented by Germany but on the EU level. (Germany is still involved - complicated matter).
Finally we should appreciate that the US government's opinion on censorship seems to have pivoted quite a lot, so I would expect free speech maximalism to not remain a very popular position on the government level (even though many people may still support it, either naïvely or with robust arguments).
Such as removals because of copyright claims?
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